



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME XXXII NUMBER 2

## UN: Good U.S. Investment

by Eleanor Roosevelt

1961  
So much has been said lately about the failures of the United Nations that some people in the United States have begun to feel the UN is only a burden to them, a cost in taxes for which they receive nothing in return.

Because of this I think that, particularly during UN week, October 19 to October 25, we should look first at what the UN really is, what it has done and what our share in this undertaking has brought us.

What is the United Nations? It is an organization of 60 sovereign nations which have agreed to abide by the articles of the UN Charter in an effort to live in a more peaceful world atmosphere among the peoples of the world. Each nation retains its sovereignty. It can withdraw from the society of nations at any time. The effort is made to conduct the business of the UN in as democratic a fashion as possible, and the will of the majority is respected, but none of the members can force any nation to do anything it does not wish to do. The best illustration of this is that the United States has just announced that henceforth it will not pay as high a percentage of UN expenses as it had agreed to pay in the past, and will start

the reduced scale in 1952, although American representatives had previously accepted this obligation on the assumption that our Congress, which has the final word in matters of finance, would agree to pay on the old scale for another year. No matter what this may mean in curtailing the work of the UN, if the United States sticks to its decision there is no way of coercing us and there would be no way to coerce any other nation.

Russia, as we all know, decided that the North Koreans were not behaving in an aggressive manner when they crossed the 38th Parallel in Korea and tried to take over South Korea, and the UN has not been able to force Russia to change its position.

So the UN remains a voluntary aggregation of nations, primarily affected by the climate of world opinion.

It is the desire of the nations themselves to increase good will in the world. This perhaps seems a weak reed to lean on, but so far I think the acceptance of decisions made by the UN shows we can count on the fact that world opinion will carry weight, and for the greater part we can count on good will among the nations.

OCTOBER 1, 1952

The specialized agencies of the UN were set up as independent agencies reporting back to the UN Economic and Social Council so that it would be possible for them to have either more or less members than the UN and to function independently. The specialized agencies have done more than any other organs of the UN to promote better understanding and good will.

For example, through the work of the World Health Organization we are gradually learning a great deal more about the needs of our fellow human beings around the world whose populations are not properly fed and not protected against diseases which are now well enough understood to be prevented. The WHO is putting on a campaign on a world scale against malaria and tuberculosis. This is important, because until people have enough health and energy to work they can not accomplish any of the things that are essential to raising their standard of living and improving their material condition to the point where they may consume such things as are manufactured by the more highly developed peoples.

Another specialized agency, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), is gradually putting together for us a picture of the world food situation and promoting greater knowledge of agriculture.

None of these agencies alone could meet any of the world problems, but joined together and working in co-operation they will succeed in doing a tremendous job that will not only

benefit the underdeveloped nations but also the developed nations which need markets for their goods. Their cooperation will lead to the purchase of raw materials by the developed nations, which can then sell the finished goods to the less industrialized countries.

### Attacks on UNESCO

The specialized agency known as UNESCO — the educational, scientific and cultural organization — has perhaps been more violently attacked than any other for the reason that its task was less easy to perform.

Education is essential to both health and the improvement of the world food supply. Controversies can develop, however, as to the methods which shall be employed to give that education. Any organization which really sets out to do something in the intellectual field where it not only touches governments but directly affects the peoples of the world is bound to have a controversial task. In any country differences of opinion as to what are the aims of education and how they shall be achieved are constantly discussed, but when an organization tries to find answers and work on a world scale it is dealing with a very difficult problem. To awaken interest in the interchange of thought and intellectual knowledge must be a concern of UNESCO, and some nations will resent and resist these efforts.

I am sure in the long run we are going to discover that we would never have reached a level of better understanding without the aid of

UNESCO, but we must be patient and wait for results, for this work, like all other international work, is experimental.

I wish that everyone in the United States would take the trouble to write to the UN and get its booklets telling of the work of the specialized agencies and, where possible, get its film strips, because everyone can understand pictures and it is thus easier to see what is really being accomplished.

Some people are disappointed because peace hasn't fallen upon us like manna from heaven. There is still fear and misunderstanding in the world, and I am afraid we must all make up our minds that peace will require as much hard work as winning a war and that we must use the UN and back it up loyally and enthusiastically, or else its efforts for gradual improvement in understanding will fail. It is the only machinery we have through which we can acquire greater knowledge of other peoples and they can acquire knowledge and understanding of us.

The return for our investment is that communism has been prevented from overrunning the world. We have allies and friends and a place where we can work together and grow to better understanding. Many misunderstandings have been cleared up short of war, and where there is war we do not stand alone. From my point of view our membership in the United Nations is a good investment.

(Mrs. Roosevelt has served on the UN Human Rights Commission since its inception in January 1946 and as a member of the United States delegation to the UN General Assembly since October 1946.)

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347

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## West Tackles Economic Problems

In the discussion of the Western nations' search for military security, so much stress is laid today on the number of divisions under arms and the availability of new weapons that the problems of finance and trade on which security depends can be easily neglected. The annual meetings of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and of the International Monetary Fund in Mexico City the first week in September served the useful purpose of drawing attention to the importance of international economics in Allied foreign policies.

The heart of the economic problem is that the trade of most of the countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is out of balance. Since the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950, those countries have been riding on a dizzy wheel. In order to rearm, they have been importing industrial raw materials at a rate which saddles them with trade deficits. These trade deficits weaken their economies and limit their capacity to rearm. Thus, the deficits disturb the economic underpinning for the military program which the NATO is trying to develop.

### Mobilizing Capital

Statements made in Mexico City highlight the fact that the United States and the European members of NATO alike are looking for some economic corrective which can get to the roots of trade and financial problems more successfully than the two consecutive schemes of American aid—the Marshall plan and the Mutual Security Program. Ivar Rooth of Sweden, president of the

Monetary Fund, observed in his annual report that the main difficulty is due to the lack of balance in the dollar trade between the United States and most of its European allies. He suggested cautiously that the members of the Fund should consult on means for liberalizing trade among themselves, and noted the "unhappy tendency" of the United States to impose quantitative restrictions on imports. John W. Snyder, American Secretary of the Treasury, proposed that the nations seek a solution by increasing the production of essential goods, cutting nonessential public expenditures, raising taxes and keeping economic controls and restrictions at a minimum. Like Mr. Rooth, he recommended the liberalization of trade, especially on the part of the United States, although American imports have gone up tenfold since 1945.

Eugene R. Black of New York, president of the International Bank, recommended in his annual report the mobilization of world capital for investment to promote industrial expansion in Europe. He said that Europe urgently needed this expansion, to be achieved through creating new plant, renewing tools and modernizing obsolete equipment. In this Mr. Black agreed with William H. Draper, United States representative at NATO, who in his August 28 report to President Truman recently recommended increased European investment (by Americans among others) and also a lowering of United States trade barriers. Mr. Black suggested that the Bank could function as the instrument for mobilizing capital for European investment. During the past three years

the Bank has centered its attention on making loans to underdeveloped countries and on financing well-defined single development projects in more advanced countries. Should it assume the new role of mobilizer of capital for Europe, it might turn into the world's foremost influence over economic affairs.

### East-West Trade Problem

Another issue underlying the trade problems of the European countries represented at Mexico City is the impact on their economies of restrictions on East-West trade. The restrictions are a corollary of the rearmament program. The United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce recommended on August 21 that the United States should lift the restrictions. A spokesman for the Council said that "emotional reactions toward trade with the Soviet nations were costing this country millions of dollars in grants-in-aid to Western European nations." It suggested that if the restrictions were not lifted, the United States should compensate European countries with new trade opportunities to replace the lost ones.

This issue illuminates one facet of the problem of dollar trade and the dollar gap. With Eastern Europe drying up as a market and as a source of goods, Western Europe finds the United States an increasingly significant source of imports but an inadequate market. Before World War II the United States accounted for 12 to 15 percent of the world's exports. Now the figure is 20 percent. But United States imports have not gone up proportionately.

BLAIR BOLLES



## Right-of-Center Reforms in France?

PARIS—Under the guidance of Premier Antoine Pinay, who last March, following the fall of Premier Edgar Faure after the Lisbon conference, formed the first right-of-center government in France since World War II, the French are witnessing an unexpected spectacle. M. Pinay, a conservative-minded small industrialist with a strong sense of civic responsibility, took office on a pledge that there would be no increases in taxes and that delinquent taxpayers would be gently treated provided they henceforth complied with the law. It had been expected both by his supporters and his opponents that he would favor industrialists and important agricultural interests and show less concern than his predecessors for the welfare of the workers on farms and in factories.

### Pinay's New Liberalism

The premier, however, has surprised everyone (some think he even surprised himself) by evolving into an increasingly determined foe of profiteering, the maintenance of high prices by cartels and other activities which threaten his main objective—to stabilize and, if possible, reduce prices so as to check the vicious spiral of inflation that threatens the French economy. In a fighting speech at the opening of the agricultural fair in the war-damaged Normandy city of Caen on August 30, M. Pinay outlined a program intended to raise the living standards and social security of the workers. He even held out the promise of proper workers' housing—a matter which has long been of top priority to the labor unions and the parties of the left.

M. Pinay describes his program as

the new liberalism which seeks both economic expansion and social progress. "It is the role of liberalism," he said at Caen, "to work without cessation for the reduction of costs and through fair competition to develop the prosperity of the greatest number. If the machinery of production is hindered by cartels and coalitions and if its distribution is hampered by unjustified profits, the government will fight against all those who by their thirst for lucre are interfering with the interests of the nation." In a language that should gladden the hearts of Ameri-

turists, notably wheat and wine growers, who are demanding price increases.

The premier's problems have been aggravated during the summer by domestic and foreign developments. On the domestic front widespread foot-and-mouth disease in the wake of drought has lessened the flow of meat to wholesale markets to such an extent that retail sellers have protested government-imposed price ceilings and in some cases have raised their prices in defiance of M. Pinay's "defense of the franc" effort. The overstocking of the French wine market has led to appeals by vineyard owners for permission to distill large amounts of wine into alcohol so as to keep wine prices high. On the foreign front the belated discovery by Defense Minister René Pleven that the United States would spend \$185 million on offshore purchases of French armaments instead of the \$625 million he had expected forced the government to realign the 1952 budget so as to meet its Lisbon commitments without breaking M. Pinay's pledge of no more taxes.

### Election Special

Handy 4-page guide to foreign policy in the current campaign. Includes Dulles-Sparkman articles from September 15 *Forum*; the foreign policy record of each party in Congress and basic questions each party wants the other to answer. Free to FPA members on request.

can trust-busters, M. Pinay added that the antitrust laws the French Parliament voted this year give the weapons needed to defend the nation against business combines.

The evolution of M. Pinay is due to his pained realization that the most dangerous opposition to his hold-the-line-on-prices policy comes not from the workers, who so far have acquiesced in a sliding wage-scale which will go into operation only if prices rise above a certain point, but from middlemen, irresponsible elements in industry, and special interests among the agricul-

### Need for Readjustments

Impartial French economists believe that while M. Pinay's economic program has not succeeded in reducing prices sufficiently to improve France's precarious balance of payments position, he has probably done as well as could be expected in the midst of the conflicting pressures applied to his government. They fear if M. Pinay should fall when Parliament reassembles in October, his successor might prove less determined in fighting inflation. Nor do they

(Continued on page 8)

# Germany's Unresolved Dilemmas



by Sigmund Neumann

Dr. Neumann is professor of government and social sciences at Wesleyan University, where he is also serving as chairman of the Department of History. He is the author of the *Headline Series* book, "Germany: Promise and Perils," and has contributed a study on German political systems to the forthcoming volume of Taylor Cole, *Major European Political Systems* (Knopf).

Germany has again entered the arena of world politics. A crucial force—decisive and disquieting at the same time—modern Germany reflects the persistent dilemmas of this *Land der Mitte* and forebodes growing internal ferment. The pending ratification of the Bonn peace contract with the Western Allies and of the European Defense Community treaty seems to indicate West Germany's successful attainment of near sovereignty and international recognition as "a powerful equal" in a definite option for Western democracy. Yet these decisions will not ease international tensions. On the contrary, they not only crystallize threats from the U.S.S.R. but also bring to the fore an adamant opposition at home. Even if the two pacts receive parliamentary approval (now that the Federal Constitutional Court on July 30 rejected a plea of the Socialist opposition seeking a temporary injunction on the grounds of their "unconstitutionality"), the internal situation is far from being settled.

An evaluation of future trends in West Germany can be only tentative and exploratory. First of all, a warning is in order. Our daily concern is naturally with the official policy-makers who alone speak up in councils and often do so effectively, like Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Yet one must not neglect popular reaction. Fumbling, unsure, contradictory though public opinion still is in the Bonn Republic, it has become increasingly articulate. This is in a way our own doing. We have exhorted the German people to make

public affairs their business; and many of them have been aroused. This notable shift is partly due to a relaxed economic situation in which fight for mere survival is no longer the only thing that matters; partly it is the consequence of new freedoms given to a nation awakening from the stupor of defeat and the irresponsibility of foreign occupation.

For the time being, this newly aroused public opinion may mean only further frustrations in a country unaccustomed to political participation, lacking proper institutional machinery, and incompetent to use it where it is available. Thus, one hears sharp criticism against the powerful chancellor, who does not seek sufficient advice from cabinet, parliament and the people and may not even keep them fully informed. Yet the political parties are left to a small group of old-time professionals. The people—skeptical, uncertain, restless—still keep out and may succumb to the cunning of a demagogue who promises them quick solutions and a safe haven.

## Unification and Integration

Three issues are foremost on the people's minds, and these are posed in terms of stark alternatives: unification and integration; rearmament and neutralism; democracy and dictatorship.

Any description of the prevalent trends in Germany today must note the gathering strength of the unity drive. No politician, whatever his personal preferences may be, can succeed without a public assurance that

his policies will soon lead to a reunited fatherland. In fact, the characteristic obsession with this issue may blind many Germans (as so often before in modern history) to the perplexities of the international situation. The more chances for unification—in view of the *fait accompli* of German partition and the intensified petrification of the world power-blocs—seem to grow remote, the more the clamor for its attainment becomes the overriding factor in German politics. This dilemma gives an air of unreality to the heated national debates and great-power exchange of notes.

The two major alternative methods of achieving unity correspond roughly to the policies of the government and of the Social Democratic (SPD) opposition. Adenauer, in a stand almost identical with that of the United States, publicly assures his people that the Western integration of the Bonn Republic will create such a position of strength, economically and politically, that by the sheer weight of its accomplishments it will automatically pull the Eastern zone into a unified, democratic Reich. Thus his plank is: Integration before unification.

In contrast to this confident view, the SPD emphasizes that the contractual agreement and especially West Germany's rearmament within the Western European framework destroy the chances for unification, which is given top priority in the Socialist program. Such an ardently nationalist position should not be simply dismissed as propagandistic

demagoguery and unprincipled expediency. In a reunited Germany the party may expect to play a greater role and to eclipse the currently ruling Christian Democratic party (CDU). But patriotism is not just a convenient discovery of the late Dr. Karl Schumacher. The SPD has always been its protagonist if not its prisoner, as the history of the First Republic can well testify. Today the SPD, with its plea for unity through direct four-power negotiations, expresses sentiments widely shared by other Germans: by the rank and file of the German Trade Unions (DGB), by numerous Protestant Church circles and by a war-weary people.

The U.S.S.R. will no doubt exploit this genuine desire for unification in Germany and the general fear of a third world war, directing it into a carefully designed peace offensive as a last weapon to forestall West German participation in European defense and integration. This drive must be evaluated in the context of over-all Soviet shifts in world-wide strategies which may call for a renewed retreat at a time when the "revolutionary situation" has passed. In the meantime the intensified Soviet campaign with its promise of all-German elections and even of Germany's full military rehabilitation has not been without effect on a deeply disturbed people who seek peace and cannot yield to the fatal split of their fatherland. An astute Soviet propaganda has put the exclusive blame for this unfortunate state of affairs on Western policies.

Despite promises, pressures and blandishments from the East, West Germany will in all probability follow Adenauer. Paradoxically enough this hour of victory may well mean the beginning of the chancellor's political decline. Once he has brought his nation back into the community

of the Western world, like Stresemann a generation ago, his services may no longer be required. Moreover, he can easily become the prisoner of his right-wing supporters, whose claims he utilizes for good measure in his astute negotiations with the Western Allies. In an eventually rearmed West Germany the right-wing groups will press for ever increased concessions, for freedom of action and finally for withdrawal from the Western Allies altogether. Ominous aggressive statements by his own cabinet members of the German party, Hans-Christoph Seeböhm and Heinrich Hellwege, show a trend, which is even more outspoken in the independent nationalist journals, such as Karl Silex' *Das Ganze Deutschland*.

### Rearmament and Neutralism

The overwhelming East-West conflict also underlies the second major issue of German politics: neutralism. Many Germans are naturally attracted by the prospects of a "neutralization," of taking Germany out of the conflict altogether and making it a buffer, a great Switzerland. Yet such an artificial vacuum could be preserved only if neighboring nations permitted it. As long as no genuine East-West agreement seems possible, the withdrawal of the occupation forces in the West will only expose the country to attack by the Soviet Union or its satellite forces. Neutralization, in other words, would mean a neutralization of United States forces. It certainly would not restore Germany to the position of a balance-wheel or a "third force" in a two-power world. The vast majority of the German people, no doubt, understand these simple facts of geography and power.

What makes neutralism so attractive, however, is its correlation with the much-desired German unity and

its confrontation with the threatening alternative: remilitarization. If unity could be bought by neutrality, many Germans would wholeheartedly embrace it. But are there any signs of the great powers' willingness to permit such a neutralized zone in the midst of the most strategic area in world affairs? And how long would Germany be ready to play such a self-effacing role? Only very few people, like Dr. Wilhelm Noack's Nauheim circle, still expect unity by neutralization.

More serious is the plea for a "neutralized Germany" in view of the threatening revival of militarism. It is difficult for young Germans to accept the complete reversal of Allied policies, within a five-year span, from unconditional demands of complete disarmament to a sudden appeal for strong defense contributions by the Reich. What better seeds for utter cynicism about the Allies' high ideals could be planted? Besides, there are real doubts on the part of a hardened war generation, which has experienced the Red Army's striking power, concerning NATO's ability to meet a Soviet challenge in the foreseeable future. The Korean war has taught the people of Europe the price of liberation; and not much solace is gained from the impregnable atomic curtain that may prove to be as ineffective as the Maginot line. Any half-hearted attempt at European defense organization must be regarded as a dangerous provocation instead of an insurance of much desired security. To the harassed European people, living in the midst of ruins, fearing inflation, social disintegration and unspeakable human destruction, peace at almost any price becomes an overwhelming desire.

For all practical purposes the SPD is today aligned with the neutralist forces of Helene Wessel, leader of the Catholic Center party, and Dr.



Gustav Heineemann, lay churchman of the Evangelical Church, who has resigned his position as Adenauer's minister of interior to lead the crusade for neutralism, unification and an unarmed Germany—despite the fact that the late Dr. Schumacher and his followers have always shown a more realistic appraisal of the U.S.S.R. and an unflinching enmity to the totalitarian dictatorship of the East. Indeed, the battle of Berlin, led courageously by the Socialist city administration of Dr. Ernst Reuter and Dr. Otto Suhr, made them democracy's champions for adequate military defense. What then explains their present turn against German rearmament? It is in the first place their fear of insufficient military guarantees on the part of the Western Allies to protect the German lands against Eastern aggression. It is secondly the threat to unification arising from a definite alliance with the West. Above all, it is anxiety over the resurgence of the much-dreaded military caste, of an aggressive nationalism and of political reaction. Here indeed lies the greatest danger for the young republic. Next to the struggle for national unification and military security, the future of the Reich's political stability represents its crucial issue, its third front. The battle for democracy is far from being won.

### Democracy or Dictatorship?

This much is clear after seven years of occupation: If democratization is to win, it can never be enforced from without but only developed from within. Now, having reached near sovereignty, the real test for German democracy's positive appeal will come. It will be a long struggle.

The German parties still live a shadow existence, reaching only a small percentage of the population

and representing a thin layer of political activity. Moreover, they are faced with critical issues, especially in view of the forthcoming national elections of 1953. If the CDU coalition falters, who is going to take over? The SPD claims to present the major alternative, but is it ready for this task? Doubts have been raised whether it has played adequately the role of a "responsible opposition," and its dynamic yet fanatic and at times demagogic leader, the late Dr. Schumacher, is partly blamed for this situation.

*Laender* elections since 1950 have shown significant shifts away from the predominant CDU to the SPD, which has made effective use of critical issues such as rearmament, economic dissatisfaction, bureaucratic mismanagement and the ever-present urge for national unity. The gain is partly due to the continuous decline of the Communist vote in West Germany (shrinking from nearly 10 percent to less than 5 percent of the electorate), partly to the influx of new voters, but above all to the SPD's disciplined organization, which becomes most effective in off-year elections. Careful voting statistics, however, make it questionable whether the SPD can win a sufficient number of middle-class votes to exceed its high mark of 35 percent of the electorate.

One may argue that the SPD, by stressing the issue of nationalism, may have prevented a part of the electorate from turning to radical parties, but it has by no means stopped the possible radicalization of the political fronts. In fact, the noisy and much-discussed reappearance of right-wing parties does not give an adequate measure of the underlying trends. The Socialist Reich party (SRP) and other extremist groups may not muster more than 10 percent of the population. What is

alarming in the political scene is not so much the actual or prospective increase of the right-wing parties themselves as the continuous pressure that they exercise on the predominant "moderate" parties. Eager to counteract and compete with an aroused public, the moderates may easily become the prisoners of a renewed radical nationalist fervor. The tenor of today's political debate often reflects such trends toward escapism.

The eventual outcome will depend on the parties' ability to recruit the proper leadership; an active mass following and the nation's youth, which still remains aloof from politics. Above all, the country will be in need of constructive programs to master its great social problems: the prevention of inflation and unemployment; the absorption of millions of expellees; a more equitable distribution of income and financial burdens; an assurance of economic advancement; and, last, the promise of a place in the community of free nations in peace and prosperity. All these conditions are not solely within German control, but Germany will have to prove daily its sincerity and its share in a responsible democratic order, at home and abroad. As yet it is too early to tell whether such a genuine democratic spirit has permeated Germany.

READING SUGGESTIONS: *Germany 1947-1949, The Story in Documents* (Washington, D.C., Department of State, 1950); Henry J. Kellermann, "Germany: Today and Tomorrow," *The Department of State Bulletin*, May 26 and June 2, 1952; J. P. Netti, *The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany* (London, 1951); Sigmund Neumann, "Germany: Promise and Perils," *Headline Series No. 82* (New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1950); *Report on Germany*, Quarterly of the Office of U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (1949 ff); Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen; *Dokumente und Akten zur Frage Deutsche-Einheit in Freiheit und Frieden* (Bonn, 1951); *Die gesamtdeutsche Frage vor den Vereinigten Nationen* (Bonn, 1952).

## Spotlight

(Continued from page 4)

regard devaluation of the franc, urged by some, as an efficacious remedy. Devaluation, in their opinion, might bring temporary relief, but would merely postpone the far-reaching readjustments in the French economy which must be made to prevent recurring crises.

These readjustments, as in the case of Britain, depend on changed conditions not only at home but also abroad. The main criticism made of M. Pinay is that with all his good qualities he is essentially provincial-minded and does not pay sufficient heed to France's international problems. Again, as in Britain, much thought is being given to ways in which the French economy could, over the long run, become less dependent on the aid of the United States. At the annual meeting in Mexico City of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Pierre Mendes-France, French governor of the Bank and often spoken of as a possible premier, went so far as to advocate a closed trading area for Western Europe:

A less drastic approach is the accelerated development of the European political and economic community. The coal and steel pool authority set up in Luxembourg on August 10 under the chairmanship

of chief French economic planner Jean Monnet will, it is hoped, act as a spur to French productivity by confronting French industrialists with the competition of other pool countries, notably Germany. For the moment, however, interest in the Schuman plan is overshadowed by concern about the future of the Saar, whose coal, currently added to the coal and steel of France under the existing economic union, balance off the coal and steel production of West Germany, which, if it recovers the Saar, would be in a position to dominate the Schuman plan pool and, through it, the economic life of the Continent.

The feeling that economic union will prove futile unless it is geared into an over-all framework of political union has led to increased discussion of plans for a united Europe. In a series of articles published by *Paris-Presse* in August, Hervé Alphand, president of the French delegation to NATO, contends that France must "make Europe" if it wants to avoid war or servitude. A first step in that direction was taken on September 10 at Luxembourg when the foreign ministers of France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux nations (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) unanimously agreed that the Schuman Plan Assembly, which will be headed by

Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, should draft plans for European political unification.

Meanwhile, like Britain, France is trying to develop the resources of its African empire and to harness them to its economy. For this it needs capital, which it hopes to obtain from government or private sources in the United States. The French, however, are sensitive about any sign of American intervention in the administration of their African colonies — particularly in Tunisia, where negotiations for a program of reforms have reached a deadlock, and in Morocco, where the French fear American trade competition.

France would also welcome an enlarged market for its exports in the United States and therefore greeted with approval the report of Mutual Security Administrator William H. Draper on August 28 urging increased American imports. But thoughtful Frenchmen realize that unless M. Pinay succeeds in substantially reducing prices, France's exports will have tough sledding in competing with other countries' goods in the American market.

In France, as elsewhere, domestic policy has become inextricably linked with foreign policy.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(This is the last of several articles on current trends in Western Europe.)

## FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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### *In the next issue*

#### **A Foreign Policy Forum**

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and James A. Wechsler of New York Post

Discuss the foreign policy record of  
Republicans and Democrats in Congress.

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